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上传时间: 2009-08-06
详细说明： The primary objective of this book is to demonstrate that a firm's financing decision depends among other things on bargaining power considerations and to illustrate potential reasons for this dependency. Based on a principal-agent analysis where a lender (princ ipal) and a firm (agent) bargain how to finance the firm's risky project, it is shown that: the advantages of debt financing increase with the firm's bargaining power; the favorability of private placements in comparison to public offerings increases with a firm's bargaining power; the firm's contract type and placement mode choice are interrelated and must be treated jointly when determining the firm's optimal financing decision; and in the presence of an ex-ante informational asymmetry about the firm's financing and the lenders' profit alternatives the contract agreement probability depends (in a non-monotonous way) on the firm's bargaining power. ...展开收缩
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